The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran by Rafat, Amir
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 10 
Number 3 Spring Article 3 
May 2020 
The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: 
Aspects of the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and 
Consular Staff in Tehran 
Amir Rafat 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Amir Rafat, The Iran Hostage Crisis and the International Court of Justice: Aspects of the Case 
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 10 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 425 (1981). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 
ARTICLE
The Iran Hostage Crisis and the
International Court of Justice: Aspects of
the Case Concerning United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran
AMIR RAFAT
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 29, 1979, the United States took its dispute with Iran
over the hostage issue to the International Court of Justice by submitting
an application' under article 40(1) of the Court's Statute" in which it
charged the Government of Iran with violation of various legal principles
embodied not only in customary international law but also in four treaties
to which both countries are party: namely, the Vienna Conventions on
Diplomatic and Consular Relations; the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights; and the 1973 Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Per-
sons, Including Diplomatic Agents.5 In defiance of its commitments under
these treaties, the application alleged inter alia, that Iran. had failed to
protect the American embassy during the events on and following Nov-
ember 4, 1979; had in fact supported and was continuing to support the
© 1981 by Amir Rafat.
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1. Application by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 38 (Jan. 1980).
2. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, article 40(1), provides that cases
are brought before the Court "either by notification of the special agreement or by a written
application addressed to the Registrar." The United States brought the case to the Court by
proceeding in the latter of the two methods provided.
3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3230, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter cited as Diplomatic Relations Convention]; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596
U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter cited as Consular Relations Convention].
4. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955, United
States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity].
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1977, T.I.A.S. No. 8532.
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actions against the embassy and its personnel; and was threatening judi-
cial proceedings against the hostages. 6 The United States asked the Court
to find that Iran had violated its international legal obligations to the
United States and to order corrective action, viz., the release of the hos-
tages and their safe departure from Iran, reparations to the United States
and its affected nationals, and the prosecution of those responsible for the
embassy seizure.7 The U.S. Government appended to its principal appli-
cation a request for interim measures,8 asking the Court to direct Iran to
release the hostages and arrange for their safe departure, to restore the
occupied premises to U.S. control, to ensure that the U.S. diplomatic and
consular staff were accorded the protections necessary to carry out their
official functions, and to refrain from any form of criminal action against
the hostages.'
The action precipitating the crisis occurred during the course of an
anti-American demonstration on November 4, 1979, about two weeks af-
ter and in protest against the admission of the former Shah to the United
States for medical treatment.10 On that day, the American embassy was
overrun and its personnel were taken hostage by an armed group of sev-
eral hundred militant students. The United States alleged that the re-
sponsible Iranian officials took no action to prevent the embassy seizure
6. Application by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DFP'T STATE BULL. 38, 40 (Jan. 1980).
7. Id.
8. Request for Interim Measures by the United States, United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, [19791 I.C.J. 7 (order granting provisional measures), reprinted in
80 DFP'T STATE BULL. 40 (Jan. 1980). Under the I.C.J. Statute article 41(1), the Court may
indicate, "if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which
ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." The Court's jurispru-
dence has determined that the rights to be so protected are those which stand in danger of
"irreparable prejudice." Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J.
3, 9, para. 25 (order denying interim protection). See Gross, The Dispute Between Greece
and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1977).
What the term "irreparable" implies is open to varying interpretations. In Aegean Sea,
some judges were inclined to give it a liberal definition. Judge Elias, for instance, contended
in his separate opinion that under certain conditions, offending the national susceptibilities
of a state may satisfy the test. [1976] I.C.J. at 30. In the present case, as will appear below,
note 59 infra, the Court seemed to imply that the rights claimed by the United States stood
in danger of irreparable harm under any definition of the term. For a view that the Court, in
considering whether to indicate interim measures, ought not rely exclusively on the concept
of irreparable harm, see Adebe, The Rule on Interlocutory Injunctions under Domestic
Law and the Interim Measures of Protection under International Law: Some Critical Dif-
ferences, 4 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 277, 289-96 (1976-77).
9. Request for Interim Measures by the United States, United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, [1979] I.C.J. 7 (order granting provisional measures), reprinted in
80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 40 (Jan. 1980).
10. Chronology of Events in Iran, Nov. 1979, 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 44 (Jan. 1980). The
following paragraphs describe events pertinent to the issues of law in the case. An extensive
reiteration of all the events surrounding the crisis is beyond the scope of this article and is
not necessary here.
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or to rescue the hostages."1 Repeated protests and attempts at negotia-
tions by the United States produced no positive response from Iran,",
with the result that, except for the release of thirteen female and black
hostages,1 the situation remained essentially unchanged until the final
resolution of the crisis in January 1981.14
Once the embassy seizure was complete, Iranian officials, including
the Ayatollah Khomeini, issued statements endorsing the militants' ac-
tion."5 These official and semi-official statements prompted the United
States to claim that, having first defaulted on their obligation to protect
the American embassy and its staff, the Iranian authorities had become
wholehearted participants in the violations of international law that had
occurred.' In the m~antime, the militants had proceeded to seize em-
11. Application by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [19801 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DmE'T STATE BULL. 38, 38 (Jan. 1980).
12. Immediately after the embassy takeover, President Carter commissioned former At-
torney General Ramsey Clark to open negotiations with the authorities in Tehran. The
Clark mission, however, aborted after the Ayatollah Khomeini issued an order forbidding
any official of the Iranian government to meet with Mr. Clark. The same order ruled out
negotiations with any other U.S. envoy. Oral Argument by Applicant (U.S. Agent Roberts
Owen), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in
80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 36, 39 (May 1980). Likewise, representations by other governments on
behalf of the United States proved fruitless, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1979, at 1, col. 6, as did
mediation efforts by representatives of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the
Pope. See Chronology of Events, supra note 10, at 44-45; N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1979, at 1,
col. 6; id. Nov. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 6. The Ayatollah Khomeini also undercut U.N. diplomatic
efforts by opposing plans for a Security Council session to discuss the crisis on the ground
that the outcome had already been dictated by the United States. Id., Nov. 28, 1979, at 1,
col. 6.
13. Three hostages-one woman and two black men-were released on Nov. 18, 1979.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1979, at 1, col. 6. A second group of ten female and black hostages
were released on Nov. 19, 1979. Id., Nov. 20, 1979, at 1, col. 4.
14. The information supplied to the Court by the United States showed that, after the
release of the 13 blacks and women, 50 hostages remained. Of that number, 28 had recog-
nized diplomatic rank, 20 were employed as members of the administrative and technical
staff and therefore also entitled to protection under article 37 of the Diplomatic Relations
Convention, note 3 supra, and two private U.S. nationals without diplomatic or consular
status. United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran, [1979] I:C.J. 7, 17-18, para. 34
(order granting provisional measures). In addition to the 50 hostages detained at the U.S.
Embassy, three diplomatic agents, including the U.S. charg6 d'affaires, were kept at the
Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran,
[1980] I.C.J. 3, 14, para. 25.
15. Immediately after the embassy takeover, the militants received encouragement
from Iranian religious leaders. N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at 1, col. 5. The Ayatollah
Khomeini at various points in the crisis expressed support for the militants. See, e.g., id.,
Nov. 8, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id. Nov. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 6; id. Nov. 21, 1979, at 13, col. 1. In a
December 16, 1979 statement, he described the militants' action as reflecting the will of the
Iranian people. Id., Dec. 18, 1979, at 1, col. 4. Bani-Sadr, then Foreign Minister of Iran, also
supported the militants, while pledging to try to find a way out of the crisis. Id., Nov. 11,
1979, at 1, col. 6. See also id., Nov. 14, 1979, at 1 col. 4 for a report on the statement by
Ghotbzadeh, then head of Iranian radio and television, implying endorsement of the em-
bassy takeover.
16. Oral Argument by Applicant (U.S. Agent Roberts Owen), United States Diplomatic
1981
DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y
bassy documents and archives, were interrogating the hostages, and were
threatening to put them on trial for alleged espionage activities. These
threats were periodically echoed in official judicial and political circles
throughout the hostage crisis.17
Against this background, the United States instituted parallel pro-
ceedings before the political and judicial organs of the United Nations,
that is, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.' 8 Iran
vigorously denied any jurisdiction on the part of the Court and, following
the precedent set by France,"9 Iceland,20 and Turkey" in previous cases of
contested jurisdiction, took no part in the oral pleadings. Nor did Iran
avail itself of its right under the Court's Statute22 to appoint an ad hoc
judge or produce anything like a cohesive statement of its position on the
law and facts of the case. Two brief messages with overlapping contents
constituted the extent of Iran's participation in judicial proceedings. One
was sent on December 9, 1979, while the Court was considering the Amer-
ican request for interim measures. Iran's basic position, as indicated in its
message of December 9, was that the hostage dispute had to be consid-
ered in its wider context and, consequently, was not appropriate for adju-
dication by the Court.23 Iran reiterated the same objection during the
course of the merit proceedings on March 17, 1980.2"
The nonappearance of a party to a dispute submitted to the Court
brings into operation article 53 of the Statute which directs the Court to
"satisfy itself, not only that it has jurisdiction, but also that the case is
well founded in fact and law."28 The Court concluded that the data sup-
and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEPT STATE BULL. 36, 41
(May 1980).
17. Id. at 50-51.
18. See U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1980, at 5.
19. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99; (New Zealand v. France),
[1973] I.C.J. 135 (orders granting interim protection); (Australia v. France), [1974] I.C.J.
253; (New Zealand v. France), [1974] I.C.J. 457.
20. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12; (Federal
Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection);
(United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3; (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),
[1974] I.C.J. 175.
21. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order deny-
ing interim protection); [1978] I.C.J. 3.
22. The I.C.J. Statute article 31(2) provides that "[i]f the Court includes upon the
Bench a Judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person
to sit as a judge."
23. Letter to the Court from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran (Dec. 9, 1979),
reprinted in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [19791 I.C.J. 7, 10-11,
para. 8 (order granting provisional measures) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Dec. 9, 1979].
24. Letter to the Court from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran (Mar. 16, 1980),
reprinted in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, 8, para.
10.
25. I.C.J. STAT. art. 53. For a discussion of the legal effects of the nonappearance of a
party, see Eisemann, Les Eflets de la Non-Comparution Devant la Cour Internationale de
Justice, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 235 (1973).
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plied by the United States constituted "a massive body of information"
concerning the facts and circumstances of the case."' It also noted that
the information supplied by the United States, which had been communi-
cated to Iranian officials, had evoked neither denial nor questioning on
their part. The bench was thus satisfied that the allegations of fact on
which the United States based its claims were well founded within the
meaning of article 53 of the Statute."'
In its order of December 15, 1979,8 the Court, by unanimous vote,
granted interim relief as requested by the United States. In its judgment
on the merits, delivered May 24, 1980,s0 the Court unanimously reiterated
the measures already indicated to Iran in its interim order, but split on
the more sensitive issues of the extent of Iran's liability and its obligation
to pay reparations for the harm caused to the United States and its
nationals.80
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff is undoubtedly one of
the most important cases ever handled by the International Court. The
substantive law issues raised in this case-more specifically, those con-
cerning Iran's violations of its obligations under customary, codified rules
of international diplomacy-were simple ones; they required no unusual
time for decision and afforded little opportunity for judicial lawmaking.
Yet, in two respects, the Court's interim and final judgments are signifi-
cant even beyond the law and facts of the case. First, the Court made
important contributions to the international lawmaking process by illumi-
nating and settling certain questions of international jurisprudence, nota-
bly those related to the indication of interim protection and to the rela-
tionship between international adjudication and the political functions
and processes of the United Nations. Second, and more important, the
hostage issue being one of the most politicized cases ever brought before
an international tribunal, its disposition by the Court raises crucial ques-
tions about the boundary between law and politics in the world commu-
nity and, particularly, the role that devolves on the Court as the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations in defining and adjusting that
boundary. This aspect of the case, to be commented on in sections VI and
VII, offers fertile ground for speculation regarding the function and the
potential of the Court in the peacekeeping processes of the international
community.
26. [1980] I.C.J. at 3, 10, para. 13.
27. Id.
28. [1979] I.C.J. at 7 (order granting provisional measures).
29. [19801 I.C.J. at 3.
30. Among the points which divided the Court was the view of the minority that the
unilateral military and economic measures undertaken by the United States between the
interim order and the final judgment-i.e., the aborted rescue mission and President
Carter's Exec. Order No. 12205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1980) regarding the future disposition of fro-
zen Iranian assets-cast doubt on U.S. intentions to settle the dispute by exclusively peace-
ful means. [1980] I.C.J. at 51, 58 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting). For a report on
the rescue operation, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
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This article examines both the law and certain policy implications of
the interim order and final judgment entered in United States Diplo-
matic and Consular Staff. Section II discusses the order of December 15,
1979, in which the Court granted interim measures; section III contains
an analysis of the jurisdictional issues in the case; and section IV exam-
ines the separation of judicial and political powers in the United Nations.
A discussion of the decision on the merits, with particular focus on the
Court's breakdown in unanimity, is contained in section V. The jus-
ticiability of politicized international disputes, together with the broader
implications of the case, are considered in section VI. Section VII summa-
rizes the substantive law contributions and, based on the case concerning
the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, suggests the imple-
mentation of a wider scope of inquiry in the resolution of adversary
claims in politicized North-South disputes.
II. THE ORDER OF DECEMBER 15, 1979
The interim measures of protection indicated by the Court coincided
closely with the measures requested by the United States. They enjoined
Iran to restore the occupied premises to U.S. control, to ensure the imme-
diate release of the hostages and their safe departure from Iran, and to
afford to all members of the U.S. diplomatic and consular staff the pro-
tections to which they were entitled under customary and conventional
law, including protection from any kind of criminal jurisdiction. At the
same time, the Court took it upon itself to call on both parties to refrain
from any action which might aggravate the tension between them or
render the existing crisis more difficult of solution. 1
A. The Special Features of the U.S. Interim Claims
One novel feature of the interim order in this case is that, together
with preventive actions-restraint from putting the hostages on trial and
from tension-aggravating acts-the Court, for the first time in its history,
required positive measures,"5 not to preserve the status quo, but to reest-
ablish "the last uncontested status prior to the controversy."3 3 In the ab-
sence of any duplication between an application and request for interim
measures, this broadening of the scope of interim protection poses no le-
gal difficulty. It is possible that, as in the present case, affirmative mea-
sures would be needed to preserve the rights claimed by one party or
another, and this possibility seems in fact anticipated in the provision of
article 75(1)-(2) of the Court's revised rules of procedure which contem-
plates the indication of interim measures that "ought to be taken or com-
31. [1979] I.C.J. at 21, para. 47.
32. The Court ordered, inter alia, the release of the hostages, their safe departure, and
the restoration of the occupied premises to U.S. control. Id..
33. This phrase was suggested in E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTROVERSIES 187 (1932).
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plied with.""' (Emphasis added.) In the present case, however, the posi-
tive actions indicated to Iran created a special situation because they
partially preempted the measures requested by the United States in its
application for a decision on the merits: the U.S. interim request and
principal application both sought, inter alia, the release of the hostages
and their safe departure."8
The duplication of the appeal for the release of the hostages and
their safe departure in the interim request and the principal application
inevitably opened up the United States to the charge that it aimed to
obtain a favorable judgment on the merits through interim relief. Iran
raised this issue in its first message, objecting that the granting of the
interim measures requested by the United States would amount to a
"judgment on the actual substance of the case." 6 Some authority for
Iran's position derived from the Chorz6w Factory case,37 wherein the Per-
manent Court of International Justice ruled that Poland had acted con-
trary to its international obligations in expropriating certain German in-
terests. Germany then sued to recover damages, and, pendente lite,
requested interim measures in the form of a prepayment on the final
award. The Permanent Court declined the request on the ground that it
was designed to give the applicant an interim judgment on part of the
substantive claim.3 s
Responding to Iran's objection, the Court in the present case limited
and distinguished the Chorz6w Factory precedent, summarily noting
that, on the one hand, the circumstances in that case "were entirely dif-
ferent," and, on the other, that "the request there sought to obtain from
the Court a final judgment on a claim for a sum of money."3 9 It is difficult
to discern from the elliptical language of the Court what precisely in the
subject matter of the German request or the circumstances surrounding it
operated to make it inapplicable to the facts of the U.S. request in the
hostage case. To help understand the Court's meaning, it is necessary to
34. I.C.J. RULES, reprinted in ACTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORGANIZATION OF
THE COURT, No. 4 (1978). Art. 75(1)-(2) provides as follows:
(1) The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the
circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures which
ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties.
(2) When a request for provisional measures has been made, the Court may
indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than those requested, or
that ought to be taken or complied with by the party which has itself made the
request. [Emphasis added.]
35. See Oral Argument by Applicant (U.S. Agent Roberts Owen), United States Diplo-
matic and Consular Staff in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 43,
47 (Feb. 1980).
36. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
37. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorz6w, [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A., No. 12 (order de-
nying interim measures). The International Court of Justice succeeded the Permanent
Court of Justice.
38. Id. at 10.
39. [1979] I.C.J. at 16, para. 28.
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put the reasoning it applied to justify the indication of protective mea-
sures in the context of its case law on the subject. The result is illuminat-
ing: the indication of provisional measures in United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff closes a gap in international jurisprudence by supply-
ing a formula for evaluating the admissiliility of interim claims when they
duplicate and preempt the subject matter of the principal application.
Turning to the Court's case law, it appears that in three
cases-Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority,0 Inter-
handel,4' and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf'2-the Court or its prede-
cessor declined to order interim measures solely'8 or partially44 because of
the absence of a link between the measures requested and the subject
matter of the principal action. The order in United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff confirms this line of jurisprudence by noting that "a
request for provisional measures must by its very nature relate to the
substance of the case since, as Article 41 expressly states, their object is
to preserve the respective rights of either party.' 45
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff is thus consistent with
previous case law in requiring a link between the injunctive measures and
the substance of the principal action. At the same time, the case raised a
related question: Even though a- link between interim and substantive
measures is required, could a case be made that the two measures must
not overlap, for if they did the granting of the request would inevitably
entail a judgment on the merits?"6 Until the hostage case, the Court's
jurisprudence did not supply a clear answer to this question. As already
noted, the Permanent Court's disposition of the German request in the
Chorz6w Factory case seemed to suggest an affirmative answer on its face:
that any overlap between the two would result in a denial of interim
measures.
47
On the other hand, in two releatively recent cases-Fisheries Juris-
diction4' and Nuclear Tests49-the Chorz6w Factory holding notwith-
40. Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58, at 175 (order denying interim measures).
41. Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), [1957] I.C.J. 105, 111-12 (order
denying interim measures).
42. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. at 14, para. 46
(order denying interim protection).
43. Case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 58, at 178 (order denying interim measures).
44. Interhandel Case, [1957] I.C.J. at 111-12; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case,
[1976] I.C.J. at 11.
45. [1979] I.C.J. at 16, para. 28.
46. For a discussion of the problems presented by overlapping interim and substantive
claims, see Cot, Affaires des Essais Nucltaires, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS DE DRorr INTERNA-
TIONAL 252, 266 (1973).
47. See text accompanying notes 37 and 38 supra.
48. (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12; (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), [19721 I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection). The United Kingdom and the
Federal Republic of Germany filed these parallel actions challenging the validity of Iceland's
VOL. 10:425
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standing-the Court acted as if an overlap in itself did not rule out in-
junctive relief. In Fisheries Jurisdiction, the Court directed the
respondent, Iceland, to withhold enforcement of its new fisheries jurisdic-
tion pendente lite.50 The interim measures ordered amounted, in effect,
to a provisional judgment on the substantive claims of the applicants, the
United Kingdom and West Germany, but the Court sought to limit the
impact of the interim measures on Iceland by directing the applicants to
restrict the fish catch of their nationals during the pendency of the case.
The interim order in Nuclear Tests was less balanced: France alone
was directed to refrain from action-that is, to refrain from conducting
atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific pending a judgment on the sub-
stantive issues involved. 5' Since the substantive issues involved the legal-
ity or illegality of such tests and therefore their continuance or perma-
nent cessation, Judges Forster 5 and Gros5 ' protested that the Court was
in fact rendering a provisional judgement on behalf of the applicants."
Preemptive as the orders in Fisheries Jurisdiction and Nuclear
Tests may have appeared, they still left the respondents with the option
of resuming the exercise of their rights-to extend fisheries jurisdiction
and resume tests, respectively-in the event of a decision on the merits in
their favor. The order in the hostage case, on the other hand, left no such
option to the respondent, who was being directed to reinstate the status
quo ante through irreversible acts. The interim order thus appeared not
as a provisional but a final judgment on a portion-and a substantial one
at that-of the principal claims. Indeed, so fully did the interim order
preempt the substantive issues that had the respondent elected to comply
with the order it would have found itself in the awkward position of join-
ing the proceedings only to settle the extent and nature of the reparations
it owed to the United States. It was perhaps with a view to making this
decision to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a 50 nautical mile zone. The legal
issues involved in the two actions were identical. See Favoreu, Les Arrts du 2 Fvrier 1973,
19 ANNUAiRE FRANVAJS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 272 (1973).
49. (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99; (New Zealand v. France), [19731 I.C.J. 135
(orders granting interim protection). The litigation arose from parallel applications filed by
Australia and New Zealand challenging the legality of the French nuclear tests in the South
Pacific. See Elkind, French Nuclear Testing and Article 41-Another Blow to the Author-
ity of the Court, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39 (1974-75); Lellouche, The Nuclear Tests
Cases: Judicial Silence v. Atomic Blasts, 16 HAIv. INTL. L.J. 614 (1975); McWhinney, Inter-
national Law-Making and the Judicial Process: The World Court and the French Nuclear
Tests Case, 3 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 9 (1975).
50. [1972] I.C.J. at 17; [1972] I.C.J. at 35.
51. [1973] I.C.J. at 106; [1973] I.C.J. at 142.
52. [1973] I.C.J. at 111; [1973] I.C.J. at 148 (Forster, J., dissenting).
53. [1973] I.C.J. at 115; [1973] I.C.J. at 149 (Gros, J., dissenting).
54. Judge Forster observed pointedly that the requested measures were "so close to the
actual subject-matter" as to be "practically indistinguishable therefrom .. " He went on to
charge Australia (and, by implication, New Zealand) with seeking "an actual judgement on
the legality, or rather the illegality, of further nuclear tests" through the interim route.
[1973] I.C.J. at 113 (Forster, J., dissenting).
1981
DEN. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y
prospect more acceptable that the Court in its interim order went out of
its way to show how the adjudicative process could be used by Iran not
only to defend itself against U.S. reparation claims, but also to submit
claims of its own related to the alleged inequities attributed to the U.S.
Government." Thus when making the usual disclaimer that the decision
in the interim proceedings did not prejudge "any question relating to the
merits themselves," the Court invited the respondent to present argu-
ments regarding the activities of the United States in Iran "either by way
of defense . . . or by way of counterclaims filed under Article 80 or the
Rules of Court."" (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing discussion yields two observations. First, until United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, international case law on the
availability of interim protection which anticipates measures requested in
the principal application was inconclusive. The Permanent Court denied
interim measures in Chorz6w Factory on the ground that the measures
sought encroached too heavily on the substantive questions. Later, the
International Court granted interim measures in Fisheries Jurisdiction
and Nuclear Tests in spite of the apparent overlap with the claims ad-
vanced for adjudication in the principal applications. Neither Fisheries
Jurisdiction nor Nuclear Tests, taken alone or together, provided clear
guidelines for the consideration of requests for interim measures in future
cases. Second, the U.S. request in United States Diplomatic and Consu-
lar Staff preempting, as it did, a pivotal portion of the claims advanced in
the principal application, placed the question of overlapping requests in
its most acute form, and in response, the Court confronted the issues in
terms that seem to have yielded a definitive criterion for the admissibility
of such requests.
The Court's reasoning was as follows. The object of interim mea-
sures, it observed, is to protect the rights claimed by either party from
"irreparable prejudice" pendente lite.57 The rights claimed in this case
included those of U.S. nationals to "life, liberty, protection and secur-
ity"" which, given the conditions under which the hostages were being
held, stood in grave danger of irreparable harm and thus needed protec-
tion of the kind requested by the United States."9 That these rights over-
lapped with those claimed in the principal application, the Court seemed
to imply, was no bar to granting protection as long as it could be shown
that the purpose of the U.S. request was "not to obtain a judgment, in-
55. [1979] I.C.J. at 10, para. 45.
56. Id. at 15, para. 24. Article 80(1) provides as follows: "A counter-claim may be
presented provided that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the
party and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court." I.C.J. RuLEs, note 34 supra.
57. [1979] I.C.J. at 19, para. 36.
58. Id. para. 37, quoting from the request for interim measures by the United States.
59. Id. at 20, para. 42. The Court stated that the continuance of the situation which
gave rise to the request would expose "the human beings concerned to privation, hardship,
anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable
harm."
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terim or final, on the merits of its claims but to preserve the substance of
the rights in claims pendente lite."0 Thus, the controlling criterion in
deciding the availability of preemptive interim protection is not the con-
tent but the purpose of the request. The question to be asked is whether
the request intends to obtain through the interim route a judgment on
the merits. If so, as in Chorz6w Factory, it must be denied as in-
admissable. If, on the other hand, the request seeks in good faith to pro-
tect the rights asserted by the claimant state, the preemptive character of
interim claims is only incidental to the circumstances of the dispute and
does not in itself preclude the granting of provisional relief. 1 Whether
relief is granted or not then depends on the existence of the second condi-
tion posited by the Court, namely, that the rights claimed by the request-
ing party stand in danger of irreparable prejudice.0 '
The authority behind the formula implicit in the Court's finding is
doubly impressive: not only was the decision reached by a unanimous
vote, but also the bench included Judges Forster and Gros who rallied to
the official opinion even though the ground they invoked for their dissent
in Nuclear Tests63-the practical indistinguishability of the interim mea-
sures from the substance of the principal action--described the circum-
stances present in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff perhaps
even better than it described those present in Nuclear Tests."s
B. The Parties' Reactions to the Interim Order
It is well known that Iran did not comply with the Court's order."
Less well known is the regrettable fact that Iran's reaction in this case fits
the pattern set by respondents in all prior cases of contested jurisdiction.
Since its establishment in 1946, the Court has received nine requests for
interim measures,6s six of which it granted.7 In no case so far has the
60. Id. at 16, para. 28.
61. Jean-Pierre Cot, supra note 46, at 269, suggested an almost identical criterion when
he wrote, "Conservatory measures are distinguishable from a provisional judgment not by
their object but by their objective. The objective is, in [the former] case, to conserve the
rights of the parties; in [the latter], to adjudicate a part of the merits."
62. The irreparable prejudice test was established in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying interim protection).
63. (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. at 111, 115; (New Zealand v. France), [1973]
I.C.J. at 137, 138 (Forster, J., and Gros, J., dissenting).
64. Since Judges Forster and Gros endorsed the order granting provisional measures
without comment, the reasons for their support of the order in this case as compared with
their opposition to the granting of interim protection in Nuclear Tests cannot be deter-
mined with certainty. While their endorsement may indicate a modification of their earlier
emphatically articulated positions, it is not unreasonable to suggest that their support of the
provisional measures indicated in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff may have
been facilated by (1) the clarity of applicable law as regards both jurisdiction and merits
and (2) the tactical desire of the bench to close ranks and thus enhance the psychological
impact of its opinion in the face of Iran's order-threatening conduct.
65. [1980] I.C.J. at 35, para. 75.
66. In addition to the present case, the Court received requests for interim measures in
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying in-
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respondent accepted or complied with the order.
While the prevailing legal opinion holds that Court orders lack bind-
ing force,"8 one can hardly avoid the conclusion that widespread noncom-
pliance with Court orders is bound to undermine confidence in the credi-
bility of international adjudication. In United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff, the challenge to the prestige and authority of the Court
was doubly serious; it emanated not only from the party contesting its
jurisdiction, but from the applicant as well. That challenge came in the
form of the April 1980 military operation within Iranian territory to res-
cue the hostages." The U.S. action, as the Court did not fail to point out,
terim protection); Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99; (New Zealand
v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 135 (orders granting interim protection); Case Concerning Trial of
Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), [19731 I.C.J. 328 (order denying interim
measures); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [19721 I.C.J. 12; (West
Germany v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection); Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89 (order granting interim measures); In-
terhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), [1957] I.C.J. 105 (order denying interim
measures).
67. The Court issued orders indicating interim measures in Anglo-Iranian Fisheries
Jurisdiction (two orders), Nuclear Tests (two orders), and United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff.
In Anglo-Iranian Oil, Iran refused to comply with the order, but the order was subse-
quently revoked when the Court upheld Iran's claim that it lacked jurisdiction to determine
the merits. [1952] I.C.J. at 93. In all the cases so far, refusal to comply has been motivated
by the respondent's denial of the Court's competence to hear the substance of the principal
application. For a discussion of pre-1974 cases, see Mendelson, Interim Measures of Protec-
tion in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259 (1972-73).
68. An early and authoritative inquiry into the drafting history of article 41 of the
STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT, which is reproduced almost verbatim in the present
Statute, concluded, "[tihere is no question of a binding order." E. DUMBAULD, supra note 33,
at 168. See also Adebe, supra note 8, at 299; Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection
in the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 273-76 (1974).
The plain meaning of the relevant provisions in the Court's Statute and procedural
rules reinforces this interpretation. Only "decisions," by implication distinguishable from
"orders," have "binding force." I.C.J. STAT., art. 59. Under article 41, the Court has the
power to "indicate" or "suggest" interim measures, which again reflects the framers' intent
to withhold from "orders" the force of res judicata. More conclusive still, the Court itself
seems to attach no adverse legal or procedural consequences to noncompliance of a party
with interim measures.
There is, however, a minority view claiming binding force for interim orders. See, e.g.,
Hambro, The Binding Character of the Provisional Measures of Protection Indicated by
the International Court of Justice, in RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION
170 (H. von Walter Schatzel & H.J. Schlochauer eds. 1956). See also 6 U.N. SCOR (559th
mtg.) para. 18, U.N. Doc. S/Agenda 554/Rev. 1 (1951), for the view presented to the Security
Council by the U.K. representative following Iran's refusal to comply with the interim order
in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [19511 I.C.J. 89 (order granting
interim measures). Essentially, that view held that the findings of the Court in an interim
order give rise to international obligations.
69. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, at 1, col. 6, for a report on the rescue attempt. In his
message to Congress, President Carter defended the rescue attempt under the U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 51 and explained that it was carried out in the exercise of a country's inherent right
of self-defense "with the aim of extricating American nationals" who were the victims of the
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was in breach of the spirit of the interim order which, as discussed above,
enjoined the parties from any action which might aggravate tensions be-
tween them.
The bench divided in its response to the attempted rescue. The
Court majority showed particular sensitivity to the fact that the operation
had been planned and carried out while the proceedings adjudicating the
claims of the United States were still pending."' It was quick, however, to
point out that the question of the legality of the rescue operation was not
before the Court, and, in consequence, would have no adverse bearing on
the claims of the United States.7'
The majority decision against allowing the rescue attempt to have an
adverse impact on the U.S. claims drew protests from two dissenting
judges. Judge Tarazi described the U.S. military attempt as "not condu-
cive to facilitating the judicial settlement of the dispute '""7 and invoked it
as partial ground for his conclusion that not only Iran but the United
States too had "incurred responsibility" ' 8 in the present case. Judge
Morozov spoke in sharper terms. In his judgment, by attempting what he
called "a military attack on the territory of the Islamic Republic of
Iran ''7 ' in defiance of the Court's order and "simultaneously with the ju-
dicial proceedings,"' "7 the United States had "forfeited the legal right as
well as the moral right to expect the Court to uphold any claim for repa-
ration. 1 6 Neither Tarazi nor Morozov went so far as to claim a binding
quality for interim orders; at the same time, contrary to the majority
opinion, they both implicitly contended that noncompliance with an or-
der can create legal liabilities and thus affect the outcome on their merits.
"Iranian armed attack" on the U.S. embassy. Letter from Pres. Carter to House Speaker
O'Neill and Sen. Magnusen (Apr. 27, 1980), reprinted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1980, at 11,
col. 3. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 provides in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations .... " Carter's language reflects a dubious interpretation of
the concept of self-defense which, within the meaning of article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
covers only defense against attacks crossing territorial borders. See P. JESSUP, A MODERN
LAw OF NATIONS 166 (1948); Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defense, 37 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 183, 266 (1961); Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation,
in GREAT ISSUES OP INTERNATIONAL PoLrrcs 32, 46-48 (M. Kaplan ed. 1970); Wright, The
Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546, 559-63 (1963).
70. [1980] I.C.J. at 43, para. 93. It was observed by the majority that "an operation
undertaken in those circumstances, for whatever motive, is of a kind calculated to under-
mine respect for the judicial process in international relations."
71. Id. para. 94.
72. Id. at 64 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 65.
74. Id. at 54 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 55.
76. Id. at 53.
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III. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. Incidental Jurisdiction
In proceedings before the International Court no less than in domes-
tic judicial proceedings, the preliminary question of jurisdiction must be
resolved before the bench can reach the substantive legal issues. Further-
more, since international jurisdiction is consensual-that is, established
by the will of the party against whom it is invoked-the Court's power to
adjudicate a claim hinges on the existence of an instrument conferring
jurisdiction on it to do so. When, as in the present case, the principal
application is accompanied by a request for interim measures, the juris-
dictional issues must be addressed for purposes both of the interim order
(incidental jurisdiction) and of the merit judgment (substantive jurisdic-
tion). Incidental jurisdiction inevitably confronts the Court with a deli-
cate legal question: To what extent is it necessary to investigate its sub-
stantive jurisdiction at this early stage? The need to act expeditiously to
protect the rights of one party or the other militates against an exhaus-
tive, and consequently prolonged, investigation. Yet, there must be at
least a presumption in favor of jurisdiction on the merits before the Court
can consider a request for interim relief. Predictably, the Court's attempt
to achieve a balance between the two considerations has provoked consid-
erable controversy.
The first time the Court faced the issue of its incidental jurisdiction
was in connection with the British request for interim measures in Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co." There, the Court overruled Iran's objection and granted
interim relief, observing simply that it could not "be accepted a priori"
that a claim based on an alleged violation of international law, as the
British claim in that case was, "falls completely outside the scope of in-
ternational jurisdiction." 8 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case 7 9 the Court
abandoned the a priori test in favor of a somewhat more conclusive show-
ing of substantive jurisdiction as a precondition for the indication of in-
terim measures. This time it settled on two tests suggested by Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht in his concurring opinion in the Interhandel Case.80 In its
adoption of these two tests, the Court observed: first, that the bench "will
not act under Article 41 in cases in which absence of jurisdiction on the
merits is manifest"; and then, that a 1961 exchange of notes invoked by
the United Kingdom as the foundation for the Court's jurisdiction ap-
peared, "prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which the jurisdiction
of the Court might be founded."81
77. (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89 (order granting interim measures).
78. Id. at 93.
79. (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12; (Federal Republic of Germany v.
Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 30 (orders granting interim protection).
80. [1957] I.C.J. 105, 117 (order denying interim measures) (Lauterpacht, J.,
concurring).
81. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12, 15-16 (or-
der granting interim protection).
VOL. 10:425
U.S. DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF
Thus, Fisheries Jurisdiction marks the point at which the Court
moved to the use of a positive test-that of prima facie evidence of a
basis on which jurisdiction might be found-in determining whether inci-
dental jurisdiction exists. In all subsequent decisions, the Court has ap-
plied the positive test in generally the same terms as appeared in Fisher-
ies Jurisdiction. As a result, the prima facie possibility test has become,
in the words of Judge Singh, "not only the latest but also the settled
jurisprudence of the Court on the subject.""2 At the same time, majority
opinions, regardless of the test applied, have invariably provoked dissent
from those who favor a fuller investigation into the Court's substantive
jurisdiction before the examination of grounds for provisional protec-
tion.88 Judges Winiarski and Badawi Pasha, for instance, in their Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. dissenting opinion, took the position that the Court
"ought not to indicate interim measures of protection unless its compe-
tence. . . appears. . . to be.. . reasonably probable."'" Judge Forster,
in his Nuclear Tests dissent, went even further, stating that he would
require that substantive jurisdiction be established with "absolute cer-
tainty" at the interim stage.88
In only one case prior to United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff did the Court's interim order produce something like a unanimous
vote. This was in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf where all twelve titular
judges participating in the proceedings voted to decline Greece's request
for interim measures.8" Even so, the vote was nonetheless characterized
82. Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), [1973] I.C.J. 99, 108-109 (Singh, J.,
concurring).
83. See, e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3, 32
(order granting interim protection) (Tarazi, J., dissenting); Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v.
France), [1973] I.C.J. 99, 113 (order granting interim protection) (Forster, J., dissenting),
123 (Gros, J., dissenting), 160 (Petren, J., dissenting); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United
Kingdom v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12, 20 (order granting interim protection) (Nervo, J., dis-
senting); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1951] I.C.J. 89, 96 (order
granting interim measures) (Winiarski, J. and Badawi Pasha, J., dissenting).
84. [1951] I.C.J. 89, 96-97 (order granting interim measures) (Winiarski, J. and Badawi
Pasha, J., dissenting).
85. [1973] I.C.J. 99, 113 (order granting interim protection) (Forster, J., dissenting).
Judge Forster's opinion, however, included the following qualification which seems to imply
that the "absolute certainty" test was suggested for cases where there are obstacles to the
Court's taking jurisdiction to determine the merits. He stated as follows: "The Order made
this day is an incursion into a French sector of activity placed strictly out of bounds by the
third reservation of 16 May 1966. To cross the line into that sector, the Court required no
mere probability but absolute certainty of possessing jurisdiction." Id.
The third reservation referred to in Judge Forster's opinion was one excluding from the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction all matters relating to "national defense." The French Gov-
ernment contended that the subject matter of the applications-the legality of atmopheric
nuclear tests-fell under the "national defense" reservation. See generally Lacharriere,
Commentaires sur la Position Juridique de la France d I'Egard de la Lic~itk de ses Expgr-
iences Nuclkaires, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 235 (1973).
86. (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order denying interim protection). The sole dis-
senting opinion was filed by the ad hoc judge appointed by Greece under the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, article 31(2).
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by serious differences among the judges as to jurisdictional and other
questions. Of the twelve judges participating, eight concurred specially in
six separate opinions, one of which-that of Judge Morozov-endorsed
the "absolute certainty" test8 7 which had been articulated by Judge For-
ster in his dissenting opinion in Nuclear Tests.'8 Set against this back-
ground, the Court's unanimity at the interim stage of the hostage case
was remarkable: not only did all fifteen judges vote in favor of provisional
measures, but none filed separate opinions, a record all the more impres-
sive because the bench included such erstwhile dissenters as Judges For-
ster and Morozov.
In spite of the adherence of these former dissenters, the interim or-
der appears not to have resolved the question of the Court's incidental
jurisdiction. Rather, the language of the opinion indicates the continued
coexistence of the two views concerning the requisite degree of certainty
that the Court has substantive jurisdiction. After reiterating the usual
pronouncement that "on the request for provisional measures . . . the
Court ought to indicate such measures only if the provisions invoked by
the Applicant appear, prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdic-
tion of the Court might be founded,"' the order indicated that at least
two of the provisions invoked by the United States provided "in the
clearest manner" for the Court's compulsory jurisdiction0 and that it was
"manifest" that the terms of these provisions furnished "a basis on which
the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded . . . ."9 This language
leaves little doubt that, from an early stage in the proceedings, the bal-
ance of the probabilities weighed heavily in favor of the Court's taking
jurisdiction, and, consequently, in the interest of achieving unanimity, the
interim order was couched in terms that accommodated not only the
prima facie possibility test, but also the more stringent requirements pos-
ited by Judges Forster and Morozov in their former opinions.
B. Substantive Jurisdiction
Pronouncements on incidental and substantive jurisdiction often
overlap, and this case was no exception. In the following paragraphs, rele-
vant portions of the interim and merit opinions are considered together
for the purpose of reconstructing the Court's findings on the subject. In
rendering its decision, the Court based its substantive jurisdiction on
three of the four treaties cited in the U.S. memorial:9 the two Protocols
attached to the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Conventions s and the
87. [1976] I.C.J. at 21 (Morozov, J., concurring).
88. [1973] I.C.J. at 113 (Forster, J., dissenting).
89. [1979] I.C.J. at 13, para. 15.
90. Id. at 14, para. 17.
91. Id. para. 18.
92. Memorial of the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, I.C.J. Pleadings 1 (1980).
93. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Optional Protocol Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; Vi-
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1955 Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States."
There was never any doubt that articles one in each of the two Proto-
cols appended to the Vienna Conventions" conferred jurisdiction on the
Court. In identical terms, these articles provide that disputes about the
interpretation and application of each convention "shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may ac-
cordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any
Party to the dispute being a Party to the present protocol."" After satis-
fying itself that both Iran and the United States had acceded to the Op-
tional Protocols, 97 the bench concluded that articles one of each of the
two Protocols furnished a basis "on which the jurisdiction of the Court
might be founded" with respect to all but two of the hostages."s
In support of the Court's jurisdiction to hear the claims involving its
two private nationals, the United States invoked the Treaty of Amity"
between itself and the respondent. This treaty obligates each party to en-
sure that within its territory, the nationals of the other party receive "the
most constant protection and security,"'0 0 and that any dispute regarding
the interpretation and application of the treaty "not satisfactorily ad-
justed by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of
Justice."' 0 '
Thus, unlike the jurisdictional clause in the Protocols to the Vienna
Conventions,0 2 the provision in the Treaty of Amity for the submission
of disputes to the I.C.J. 0° does not create in express terms a unilateral
right to take a dispute to the Court. Nevertheless, the United States con-
tended that it had been the intention of the negotiating parties to create,
just as analogous clauses in other amity and establishment treaties gener-
ally do, a right of unilateral recourse."04 The bench accepted this interpre-
enna Convention on Consular Relations Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Set-
tlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter cited as
Protocols to the Vienna Conventions].
94. Note 4 supra.
95. Note 93 supra.
96. Id.
97. [1979] I.C.J. at 13-14, para. 16.
98. Id. at 14, para. 18.
99. Treaty of Amity, note 4 supra.
100. Id. art. II, para. 4.
101. Id. art. XXI, para. 2.
102. Protocols to the Vienna Conventions, note 93 supra.
103. Treaty of Amity, art. XXI, para. 2, note 4 supra.
104. The United States also contended that, while the Treaty of Amity provides that
disputes "not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy" be taken to the Court, Iran's persist-
ently negative attitude toward negotiation in the hostage case made it "indisputable that
under the treaty of amity," the case was properly before the Court. Oral Argument by the
United States (U.S. Agent Roberts Owen), United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 40, 45 (Feb. 1980). The Court
majority accepted the U.S. contention, noting "the refusal of the Iranian Government to
enter into any discussion of the matter." [19801 I.C.J. at 27, para. 51.
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tation in the merit judgment; 10 5 for purposes of the interim order, how-
ever, it was satisfied that the Protocols to the Vienna Conventions had
sufficiently established the Court's jurisdiction to cover all U.S. claims
including those related to the two private individuals.'"1 The interim or-
der reached this result with great subtlety of argument, pointing out that
the acts against the private individuals had been committed in the em-
bassy compound and as such came within the purview of the same juris-
dictional clause which conferred authority on the Court to adjudicate dis-
putes arising under the Vienna Conventions.107 Thus, striking a blow for
the promotion of international human rights, the Court went beyond the
literal meaning of the Vienna Conventions to create rights for nondiplo-
mats when found on internationally protected grounds.
The merit decision addressed the issue of the jurisdictional signifi-
cance of the Treaty of Amity. The American Government contended that
article XXI, paragraph 2 of the Treaty created a right of unilateral appeal
to the International Court.0 8 The Court had reserved its position on that
question in the interim order, 09 but it agreed with the United States in
its judgment on the merits. It observed, "Provisions drawn in similar
terms are very common in bilateral treaties of amity or of establishment,
and the intention of the parties in accepting such clauses is clearly to
provide for such a right of unilateral recourse to the Court .... ."1"o Two
of the judges did not share the majority's endorsement of the U.S. views
on the applicability of the Treaty of Amity, and that difference of opinion
was one of the questions over which the unanimity which characterized
the interim order broke down."' Judge Morozov faulted the Court's reli-
ance on the Treaty of Amity as both unnecessary for the jurisdictional
needs of the case-as shown by the Court itself in the interim order-and
legally unsound.'" The latter conclusion rested on the premise that, be-
ing indisputably consensual, the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be in-
ferred unless expressly provided for by the parties in prior or ad hoc
agreements.1 8 Moreover, both Judges Morozov and Tarazi invoked the
unilateral measures taken by the United States against Iran to conclude
that the applicant had forfeited the right to rely on the Treaty of
105. [1980] I.C.J. at 27, para. 52.
106. [1979] I.C.J. at 14, para. 19.
107. Id.
108. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
109. [1979] I.C.J. at 14-15, para. 21.
110. [1980] I.C.J. at 27, para. 52. Given the common use of clauses analagous to art.
XXI, para. 2 in the Treaty of Amity, note 4 supra, the Court's consecration of the right of
unilateral application amounts to a considerable widening of its potential jurisdictional
base. The U.S. Memorial cited 17 treaties of establishment concluded by the United States
since 1945 which contain jurisdictional provisions analogous to art. XXI, para. 2. Memorial
by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Plead-
ings 1, 72-73 (1980).
111. [1980] I.C.J. at 51, 58 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 51-52, para. 3 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 52.
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Amity. 114
Next, the Court addressed the question of the justiciability of the
dispute, a question raised by Iran in its message of December 9, 1979.
The objection is stated in the following passage, quoted at length here
because the language indicates the perspective from which Iran viewed
the hostage crisis:
[The hostage] question only represents a marginal and secondary as-
pect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied sepa-
rately, and which involves, inter alia, more than 25 years of continual
interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the
shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpe-
trated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all
international and humanitarian norms.
The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United
States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the
treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results
from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and
more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the
American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the
whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United
States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, inter alia, all the
crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular
the coup d'etat of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the
overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the
restoration of the Shah and of his regime which was under the control
of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and polit-
ical consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as
well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international
norms, committed by the United States in Iran.115
Its excessive rhetoric notwithstanding and even though only cryptically
formulated, the above-quoted passage raised a serious question about the
justiciability of the dispute. Iran's position, as appears from this passage,
was that more fundamental principles of international and humanitarian
laws which the United States allegedly violated in its relations with Iran
over the twenty-five years previous overcame the U.S. claims. Implicit in
Iran's objection was the position that a highly politicized dispute could
not be separated from its politico-historical context.
The Court rejected Iran's objection with two arguments. In the in-
terim order, it unanimously responded that the seizure of an embassy and
114. Id. at 52, 65 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
115. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra. Iran's position in this message rests on a
typical Third World premise encountered frequently in legal disputes arising from the
decolonization process-namely, that legal claims must be assessed in their larger historical
and political contexts to arrive at an equitable allocation of rights and responsibilities. See
generally J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusncE 23 (1976); S.
ROSENNE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 103 (1965); Anand, Attitude of
the Asian-African States Toward Certain Problems of International Law, 15 INT'L & COmp.
L.Q. 55 (1966).
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its internationally protected staff "cannot. . . be regarded as something
'secondary' or 'marginal', having regard to the importance of the legal
principles involved . . . ." To this, the Court majority added a second
argument in its merit decision, to wit:
[N]ever has the view been put forward before that, because a legal
dispute submitted to the Court is only one aspect of a political dis-
pute, the Court should decline to resolve for the parties the legal
questions at issue between them. Nor can any basis for such a view of
the Court's functions or jurisdiction be found in the Charter or the
Statute of the Court .... 117
In its first response to Iran's objection to the justiciability of the dis-
pute, the Court missed a subtle but critical element in Iran's reasoning:
that reasoning did not imply, as the Court seemed to assume, that the
hostage issue was "secondary" or "marginal" in itself; rather, it described
the issue as a secondary and marginal aspect of the "overall problem" of
Iran's grievances against the United States. Nonetheless, the Court's sec-
ond response deserves particular attention as it confirms and expands an
important point of its Aegean Sea Continental Shelf jurisprudence. In
that case, the Court held that a dispute with "some political element" '
is neverthless justiciable when "it is manifest that legal rights lie at the
root of the dispute."' "1 (Emphasis added.) In the present case, the major-
ity went beyond Aegean Sea Continental Shelf by holding justiciable le-
gal claims which are "only one aspect of a political dispute."1 20 (Empha-
sis added.)
IV. THE SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL POWERS IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
In terms of the law of the United Nations, the most interesting fea-
ture of the hostage case is that it was brought simultaneously before the
Security Council and the International Court. 2" This parallel pursuit of
political and judicial remedies in turn led the Court to address the ques-
tion of the separation of powers between the Court and the Security
Council-a matter of central importance in the workings of the United
Nations and one which had been left unclear after the Aegean Sea Conti-
nental Shelf case. 2 ' Because the Court went opposite ways on similar
facts in Aegean Sea and United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff,122
this section discusses both cases and concludes with suggestions as to the
meaning of United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff for the law on
116. [1979] I.C.J. at 15, para. 23.
117. [19801 I.C.J. at 20, para. 37.
118. [1978] I.C.J. at 13.
119. Id.
120. (1980] I.C.J. at 20, para. 37.
121. See U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1980, at 5.
122. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), [1976] I.C.J. 3 (order deny-
ing interim protection).
123. [19801 I.C.J. at 21-22, para. 40.
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concurrent jurisdiction between political and judicial organs of the
United Nations.
While it is beyond the scope of this article to offer an indepth exami-
nation of the actions and proceedings of the Security Council in connec-
tion with the hostage crisis, a brief review of the activities of the Council
will help pinpoint the parallels and differences between the present case
and Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. As noted above, shortly after the em-
bassy takeover, the U.S. Government reported the incident to the Secur-
ity Council and requested that it undertake deliberations as to what
might be done to resolve the crisis. 2 ' Following this initiative, the U.N.
Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, urgently requested the Security
Council to act on the Iran hostage situation which he described as posing
a serious threat to international peace and security."" This request came
on November 29, 1979, only four days after the United States submitted
its application and request for interim measures to the Court. The Coun-
cil convened on November 29 and December 4, and on the latter date it
unanimously passed resolution 457, calling on Iran to free the embassy
personnel immediately, to provide them with protection, and to allow
them to leave the country.'26 The resolution called on the parties to take
steps to resolve by peaceful means the remaining issues between them
and instructed Secretary-General Waldheim to lend his good offices for
achieving the object of the resolution and report to the Council of his
efforts. 127 In the meantime, the Council was to "remain actively seized of
the matter."''
The Security Council met again on December 31, 1979-sixteen days
after the Court handed down its interim order-and adopted a second
resolution in which it reiterated the content of resolution 457 and once
again instructed the Secretary-General to lend his good offices to bring
about a peaceful resolution of the crisis.'2 ' Acting on this instruction, Sec-
retary-General Waldheim visited Tehran January 1-3, 1980, and on Feb-
ruary 20, in agreement with the Governments of the United States and
Iran, set up a Commission of Inquiry to undertake a fact-finding mission
in Tehran, to hear Iran's grievances against the United States and to seek
an early solution to the crisis. 80 The Commission went to Tehran, held
124. For a review of U.N. action on the hostage issue, see U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1980, at
17.
125. Letter from Secretary-General Waldheim to the Security Council Pres. (Nov. 25,
1979). 34 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/13646 (1979).
126. S.C. Res. 457, 34 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) -, U.N. Doc. S/Res/457 (1979),
reprinted in U.N. CHRON., Jan. 1980, at 13.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. S.C. Res. 461, 34 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.), U.N. Doc. S/Res/461 (1979),
reprinted in U.N. CHRON., Mar. 1980, at 26.
130. The Commission was composed of Andres Aguilar (Venezuela), Mohamed
Bedjaoui (Algeria), N.W. Jayewardene (Sri Lanka), Louis-Edmond Pettiti (France), and
Adib Daoudy (Syria). U.N. CHRON., Apr. 1980, at 16.
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several meetings with the Iranian authorities, but under the political con-
ditions prevailing in Iran, was unable to meet the hostages as had been
promised. "1 On March 10, it suspended its activities, announcing how-
ever that it was prepared to return to Tehran when conditions changed in
order to complete its mandate"'
The United Nations' political involvement in the crisis raised ques-
tions about the impact such proceedings would have on the Court's han-
dling of the U.S. application and interim request in light of the denial of
provisional measures in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf. That case arose
from competing claims by Greece and Turkey to the continental shelf of
the sea separating the two countries. Greece brought the case before the
International Court and the Security Council in parallel actions.' In the
proceedings before the Court, the Greek Government requested that the
Court order both parties to refrain from all exploration activity and scien-
tific research in the continental shelf areas and to refrain from actions
which might endanger their peaceful relations."' The Court declined this
request on the ground that, the Security Council having met on the issue
with the participation of the representatives of Greece and Turkey and
having urged the parties to do anything in their power to reduce tensions
in the area, it was inappropriate for the Court to duplicate the recom-
mendation of the Council.13 5 The Court went on to observe that "both
Greece and Turkey . . . have expressly recognized the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity" and that "it is not to be presumed that either State will fail to
heed the recommendation of the Security Council .... "136
Thus, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf raised the important constitu-
tional question of concurrent jurisdiction between the political and judi-
cial organs of the United Nations, or, more specifically, whether the pur-
suit of parallel political action in a policy-making organ inhibits the Court
from ruling on issues submitted for adjudication. The tenor of the deci-
sion lends itself to the interpretation that the Court was giving applica-
tion to the rule electa una via,13 perhaps not as a general principle of the
131. Id., May 1980, at 5.
132. Id.
133. See generally Gross, note 8 supra.
134. [1976] I.C.J. at 4-5, para. 2.
135. Id. at 13, paras. 41-42.
136. Id. para. 41.
137. Under electa una via, a state must exhaust the procedure of settlement already
selected. Applied to United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, it would have required
the exhaustion of the political remedies through the Security Council and allowed resort to
another mechanism or forum only in case of failure. That the Court's decision in Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf may be interpreted as an application of the rule electa una via is
suggested by Coussirat-Coustere, Indication de Mesures Conservatoires dans l'Affaire de
Personnel Diplomatique et Consulaire des Etats-Unis & Thran, 25 ANNUAIRE FRANVAIS
DE D)Rorr INTERNATIONAL 297, 300 (1979). For a general discussion of the doctrines of litis-
pendence and electa una via in the context of the law of the United Nations, see Ciobanu,
Litispendence Between the International Court of Justice and the Political Organs of the
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law of the United Nations, but at least as a matter of self-restraint prac-
ticed by the Court with a view to preventing conflicting resolutions of the
same issue by two or more organs of the World Organization. At the same
time, this judicial deference to the Security Council resolution provoked
reservations from some judges who, even though supportive of closer inte-
gration of the Court in the U.N. system, nonetheless favor a more dy-
namic approach to its power assignment under the Charter. This position
was set out with force and logic by Judge Lachs whose separate concur-
ring opinion in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf merits quotation at length
because, after United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, it now re-
flects the official opinion of the Court.
There are obviously some disputes which can be resolved only by ne-
gotiations, because there is no alternative in view of the character of
the subject-matter involved and the measures envisaged. But there
are many other disputes in which a combination of methods would
facilitate their resolution. The frequently unorthodox nature of the
problems facing States today requires as many tools to be used and as
many avenues to be opened as possible, in order to resolve the intri-
cate and frequently multi-dimensional issues involved. It is sometimes
desirable to apply several methods at the same time or successively.
Thus no incompatibility should be seen between the various instru-
ments and fora to which States may resort, for all are mutually com-
plementary. Notwithstanding the interdependence of issues, some
may be isolated, given priority and their solution sought in a separate
forum. In this way it may be possible to prevent the aggravation of a
dispute, its degeneration into a conflict. Within this context, the role
of the Court as an institution serving the peaceful resolution of dis-
putes should, despite appearances, be of growing importance. s39
In the case instituted by the United States against Iran, the parallels
with the facts of Aegean Sea Continental Shelf were inescapable. Here
too the Security Council had met and adopted, in advance of any action
by the Court, a resolution which called for the very same thing that the
United States request aimed to achieve, namely, the release and safe de-
parture of the hostages. That the United States was concerned lest the
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf holding adversely affect its case before the
Court was clear from a statement by its U.N. representative following the
Security Council's unanimous vote on resolution 457. In that statement,
Mr. McHenry reminded his Council colleagues that their vote "was not
intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Na-
tions," and further that "[n]either the United States nor any other mem-
ber intended that the adoption of the resolution should have any prejudi-
cial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the
indication of provisional measures of protection by the ICJ.'" ss In pro-
United Nations, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 209, 216 (L. Gross
ed. 1976). See also S. ROSENNE, note 115 supra.
138. [1976] I.C.J. at 19, 20 (Lachs, J., concurring).
139. 34 U.N. SCOR (_ mtg.) 11, U.N. Doc. S/P.V. 2178 (1979).
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ceedings before the Court, the U.S. Agent pursued the same line by first
distinguishing the present case from Aegean Sea Continental Shelf on
several grounds including Iran's persistent refusal to negotiate, and then
reminding the Court that no disposition in any text governing its func-
tions precluded the Court from adjudicating in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are properly brought before it. ' "
The interim order in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
implicitly accepted the United States' position by indicating the measures
requested, but without addressing the question of concurrent jurisdiction
at all.1"" In the merit decision, however, the Court returned to the subject,
and this time offered a reasoned presentation of its views regarding the
relationship between I.C.J. proceedings and activities of other U.N. or-
gans."4 In summary, the basic proposition the Court sought to establish
is that there is no constitutional obstacle to the exercise by the I.C.J. of
its judicial functions with regard to a question which is pending before
the Security Council or, by extension, before any other principal or sub-
sidiary organ of the United Nations. To establish this, the judgment in-
voked article 12 of the Charter143 which, while expressly forbidding the
General Assembly from taking any action with regard to disputes or situ-
ations under consideration by the Security Council, puts no such restric-
tion on the functions of the Court. 14 An illuminating passage in the deci-
sion states that "[i]t is for the Court, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, to resolve any legal questions that may be in issue be-
tween parties to a dispute; and the resolution of such legal questions by
the Court may be an important, and sometimes decisive, factor in pro-
moting the peaceful settlement of a dispute."' 5 The Court also pointed
out that article 33 enumerates arbitration and judicial settlement to-
gether with the political processes of negotiation, inquiry, mediation, and
conciliation as methods for the peaceful settlement of conflicts " e Follow-
ing a detailed examination of events in the Security Council and the es-
tablishment of the Commission of Inquiry, the Court concluded that
"neither the mandate given by the Security Council to the Secretary-Gen-
140. Oral Argument by the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff
in Tehran, [1980] I.C.J. 3, reprinted in 80 DEP'T STATE BULL. 40, 47-48 (Feb. 1980).
141. The order made only a brief reference to the Security Council action on the hos-
tage issue, and that in a context unrelated to the issue under discussion here. [1979] I.C.J. at
15, para. 23.
142. [1980] I.C.J. at 20-24, paras. 39-44. This part of the judgment is all the more re-
markable as it was included without the invitation of either party. It was as if the judges
were looking for a way to set the record straight as to their place in the overall U.N.
peacekeeping framework.
143. Article 12, paragraph 1 provides: "While the Security Council is exercising in re-
spect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the
General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situa-
tion unless the Security Council so requests."
144. [1980] I.C.J. at 21-22, para. 40.
145. Id. at 22, para. 40.
146. Id. at 23, para. 43.
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eral in resolutions 457 and 451 of 1979, nor the setting up of the Commis-
sion by the Secretary-General, can be considered as constituting any ob-
stacle to the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction .... ,,147 Even though the
Court did not discuss it, indirect support for its holding can be drawn
from the practice of the political organs themselves, which, while in some
cases finding it unwise to take action on an issue which is before the
Court, have never acknowledged the principle of unity of proceedings as a
binding rule in the law of the United Nations. 148
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff therefore suggests a
division of functional responsibilities between the Court and other U.N.
organs, one that does not preclude, or indeed may even dictate, the simul-
taneous application of political and legal methods to the resolution of in-
ter-state disputes. This dynamic view of the Court's power assignment is,
however, balanced in the merit judgment by two unstated but implicit
qualifications. First, the tenor of the decision suggests that, even though
entitled to the independent exercise of its judicial functions, the Court
nevertheless would exercise self-restraint if it is shown that its activities
might obstruct the political organs. Thus, the Court would have at least
postponed its proceedings had it been given to understand that their con-
tinuance would impede the efforts of the Security Council, the Secretary-
General, or the Commission of Inquiry." s9 The judges went out of their
way to show that neither the Government of Iran, nor that of the United
States, 50 nor any spokesman for the United Nations had suggested that
the Court's proceedings might be affected by the existence of the Com-
mission of Inquiry or by the mandate given to the Secretary-General.' 6'
A second qualification implicit in the decision is that Court proceed-
ings might be affected by the decision of a political organ to set up an
adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative body with respect to the dispute under
147. Id. at 23-24, para. 44.
148. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 115, at 226. In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the fact
that the legal aspects of the dispute had been submitted to the Court was well known to the
Security Council but did not prevent it from passing a resolution on the matter. See text
accompanying notes 135, 136 supra. The Government of South Africa raised the objection of
sub judice in the General Assembly debate in connection with the South West Africa Cases
but without success. Gross, supra note 8, at 37.
149. This conclusion is based on the language and tone of the Court's opinion in
paragraphs 40, 41, and 42. [1980] I.C.J. at 21-22. See, e.g., note 150 infra.
150. The Court noted that, at one point in the proceedings, the U.S. Government re-
quested that the Court defer setting a date for the opening of oral argument. In making the
request, the U.S. agent invoked the delicate stage of negotiations then pending on the re-
lease of the hostages. The following day, February 20, 1980, the U.N. Commission was estab-
lished. Responding to an invitation to clarify the U.S. position as regards the future pro-
ceedings, the U.S. agent advised the Court on February 27 that the Commission would not
address itself to the legal claims of the United States and that his government was anxious
to secure an early judgment on the merits. The United States suggested March 1 for the
opening of the oral proceedings, but still reserved the right to request a postponement if the
circumstances warranted. [1980] I.C.J. at 22, para. 41.
151. Id. at 22-23, para. 42.
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consideration. Had the Secretary-General, in fulfilling the mission given
him by the Security Council, opted to set up a tribunal instead of a non-
adjudicative commission to examine the matter of law in dispute between
Iran and the United States, United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff may not have been decided as it was. In its opinion, the Court ob-
served that the Commission of Inquiry "was not set up by the Secretary-
General as a tribunal empowered to decide the matters of fact or of law in
dispute between Iran and the United States; nor was its setting up ac-
cepted by them on any such basis."152 In exactly what way the appoint-
ment of a tribunal would have affected the Court proceedings is not clear.
The Court's observations nonetheless indicate that it acknowledges that,
while the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, it does not have
a monopoly on the adjudicative processes contemplated under article 33
of the Charter.
V. THE MERIT DECISION
To determine the existence and nature of Iran's liability, the Court
took a two-step approach to the facts, examining first the extent to which
the acts in question were imputable to the Government of Iran, and sec-
ond, the status of those acts under applicable treaty and general interna-
tional law provisions.153 It found Iran guilty of acts of omission and com-
mission: in the initial phase, by failing to protect the embassy and its
staff,'" and, in the second phase, by endorsing the continued occupation
of the embassy and detention of the hostages.155 Repeated endorsements
of the militants by official organs of the Iranian State fundamentally
transformed the legal nature of the hostage situation. "The militants,"
the Court concluded, "had now become agents of the Iranian State for
whose acts the State itself was internationally responsible."' "
The bench was unanimous in upholding the American claim that the
acts thus attributable to Iran were incompatible with the norms of cus-
tomary international law as codified in the 1961 and 1963 Vienna Con-
ventions. Particularly, Iran had violated its obligations, laid down in iden-
tical terms in the two conventions, to protect the diplomatic and consular
premises, archives, and other documents,"7 to ensure respect for the free-
152. Id. at 23, para. 43.
153. Id. at 28-29, para. 56.
154. The Court concluded that the militants' attack on the embassy had an "initially
independent and unofficial character." Id. at 30, para. 59. This, however, did not absolve
Iran of responsibility in regard to the attack. Iran, the Court observed, failed to carry out its
obligations under the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Conventions, note 3 supra, "to
take appropriate steps to ensure the protection" of the embassy, its staff, and archives.
(1980] I.C.J. at 30, para. 61.
155. Id. at 33-37, paras. 71-78.
156. Id. at 35, para. 74.
157. Articles 22 and 24 of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra, proclaim
the inviolability of the premises and archives of a diplomatic mission. Analogous provisions
are found in articles 31(3) and 33 of the 1963 Consular Relations Convention, note 3 supra,
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dom and dignity of the embassy personnel,58  and to allow them full facil-
ities and protection for the performance of their official functions.'
Likewise, Iran had defaulted on its obligation under the Treaty of Amity
to afford protection within its territory to U.S. private nationals. 1'" In
light of these findings, the merit decision unanimously renewed the ear-
lier call for the release and safe departure of the hostages and the restora-
tion of the embassy compound to U.S. possession.61e Once again the Ira-
nian authorities were warned against subjecting the detained diplomats
and consular agents to any form of judicial proceedings.'6 2
The Court's unanimity broke down when it came time to assess the
legal consequences of the violations set out in the judgment. Still, there
was a large majority to uphold most of the remaining U.S. claims: the
judges voted thirteen to two that Iran had incurred responsibility vis-a-
vis the United States"' and twelve to three that it owed reparations to
the U.S. Government.'" The Court did not rule on the U.S. request for
the prosecution of the militants.
The implicit but major point of disagreement between the majority
and dissenting judges was whether Iranian assertions regarding the al-
leged pattern of indirect U.S. aggression against Iran had legal validity
and, if so, whether these assertions could be considered in assessing the
blame of one side or the other. Iran's communications to the Court'"
cited various U.S. acts going back to and including alleged CIA complicity
in the events of 1953 as overriding the U.S. claims.'" In a passage re-
markable for its adherence to the strict rules of judicial procedure, the
Court majority rejected these charges, first, as unsupported by evidence
owing chiefly to Iran's failure to plead its case,167 and second, as irrele-
regarding consular premises and archives.
158. Article 29 of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra, provides as fol-
lows: "The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any
form of arrest or detention. The receiving state shall treat him with due respect and shall
take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom, and dignity." For
consular officers, article 40 of the Consular Relations Convention, note 3 supra, provides as
follows: "The receiving state shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all
appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom, or dignity," but article
41(a), while exempting consular officers from liability to "arrest or detention," provides that
such exemption does not apply "in the case of a grave crime and pursuant to a decision by
the competent judicial authority."
159. Article 25 of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra, and article 28 of
the Consular Relations Convetion, note 3 supra, obligate the receiving state to "accord full
facilities for the performance of," respectively, "the functions of the [diplomatic] mission"
and "the consular post."
160. Treaty of Amity, art. II, para. 4, note 4 supra.
161. [19801 I.C.J. 3, 44-45, para. 3.
162. Id. at 45, para. 4.
163. Id. at 44, para. 2 (Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 45, para. 6 (Lachs, J., Morozov, J., and Tarazi, J., dissenting).
165. See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
166. Id.
167. [1980] I.C.J. at 38, para. 82.
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vant to the merits even if established with requisite proof.68 To defend
this second proposition, the majority appealed to what it called the "self-
contained" 1s character of the rules of diplomatic law, which, in the ma-
jority's description, balances the obligations imposed on the receiving
state with "efficacious" 110 means of defense against illicit actions by diplo-
matic and consular agents. These means include, first, the privilege ac-
corded to the receiving state to declare any member of a diplomatic mis-
sion persona non grata and secure that person's recall, 71 and second, the
more radical remedy of breaking diplomatic relations with the offending
state. 17s Having failed to resort to remedies afforded by diplomatic law
for dealing with alleged U.S. activities, Iran could not cite those activities
to justify its conduct or mitigate its responsibilities.1 78
Judges Morozov and Tarazi, by contrast, acknowledged the validity
of Iran's allegations and concluded that they must be brought to bear on
the final assessment of the parties' contending claims.1 74 Iran's liabilities,
in the words of Judge Tarazi, were "relative," not "absolute. 1 7 It was
chiefly for this reason that both judges voted to dissent from the majority
finding that Iran owed reparations to the United States.
VI. JUSITICIABILITY OF POLITICIZED DisPuTEs: THE BROADER
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
That United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff made important
contributions to the international law-making process has been amply
demonstrated in the preceding pages. In addition to these contributions,
there is yet another respect in which the case is likely to stand out as a
landmark in the annals of the International Court. Since its founding, the
Court has remained on the periphery of the major international
problems.1 7  With one possible exception,1 7 7 no major order-threatening
168. Id. para. 83.
169. Id. at 40, para. 86.
170. Id. at 40-41, para. 87.
171. Under article 9(1) of the Diplomatic Relations Convention, note 3 supra,
The receiving State may at any time and without having to explain its deci-
sion, notify the sending State that the head of the mission or any member of
the diplomatic staff of the mission is persona non grata .... In any such case,
the sending State shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or
terminate his functions with the mission.
172. [1980] I.C.J. at 39-40, para. 85.
173. Id. at 40-41, paras. 87 & 89.
174. Id. at 52 (Morozov, J., dissenting), and 59 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 61 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
176. See generally J. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, note 115 supra.
177. South West Africa Cases, [1966] I.C.J. 6. These cases dealt with the status of
Namibia. South Africa failed to comply with the Court's advisory opinions which recognized
the United Nations as the successor to the League of Nations in the supervision of the
surviving League mandates. Ethiopia and Liberia then filed separate proceedings with the
object of transforming the advisory opinions into binding decisions. The Court was thus
invited to rule on a major international issue. However, it dismissed the actions on the nar-
row procedural ground that the applicants lacked sufficient legal interest to file a claim. See
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issue arising from the Cold War or the decolonization process-the two
major axes of conflict in post-War politics-was brought to the Court for
adjudication. Against this background, the hostage case is an exception to
the trend: in it the Court was invited to rule on one of the most compli-
cated, politicized, tension-laden cases in the post-War period. Accepting
the challenge, the Court reaffirmed the justiciability of politicized dis-
putes and suggested that the range of justiciable disputes is even broader
than the range suggested by the language on that question in Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf."'
Such disputes, however, confront a court of law with the problem of
deciding whether and to what extent judicial inquiry can be extended to
include the history or the nonlegal, usually political, aspects of the case.
Faced with this question, the Court majority came down squarely on the
side of narrowly defined, conservative notions of justiciability-hence, its
terse dismissal of all Iranian charges against U.S. diplomacy as either un-
related to the issues before the Court or only vaguely defined and there-
fore unsubstantiated.
The possible reasons for the Court's decision in this regard are va-
ried. To be sure, Iran's absence from the proceedings made it difficult for
its claims to be articulated with requisite precision and proof. Perhaps
too, considerations of judicial strategy played a role in influencing the
majority's choice of justiciable issues: faced with an action that struck at
one of the foundations of the international public order, the judges may
have felt the need to define in the most uncompromising terms the over-
riding character of the norms being violated. Any manifestation of judi-
cial sympathy for Iran's long-standing political grievances, the judges may
have felt, would only dilute what was intended to appear as an emphatic
and unambiguous defense of the institutions governing the conduct of in-
ter-state relations. Finally, considerations of judicial strategy aside, there
was solid theroretical grounding for the Court's reluctance to extend the
range of inquiry into the history and politics of the case-namely, the
traditional notion that the judiciary must shun involvement in essentially
political activities. According to this view, politicized disputes are justici-
able, but only to the extent that they involve legal issues which must be
separated from their context and adjudicated through impartially admin-
istered rules of international law.
Whatever the practical or theoretical merits of the majority's meth-
odological choice, it is arguable that, since it was characterized by a nar-
row framing of relevant issues, the majority's approach was less than
commensurate with the challenge presented by politicized disputes which
occur in the context of North-South politics. 71 Such disputes often in-
R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SociETY 378 (1970).
178. See text accompanying notes 118-120 supra.
179. The term "North-South" is used to describe relations between developing and de-
veloped, i.e., Western countries.
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volve deep-seated, long-standing grievances, and it is difficult to see how
the international adjudicatory machinery can resolve them equitably un-
less it applies a wide enough framework of judicial appraisal to accommo-
date the claims arising from the historical antecedents or even from the
politics of the case. This point was implicit in Judge Tarazi's dissenting
opinion in the present case. He wrote as follows:
It has been argued that more [that is, delving more deeply into the
history of U.S.-Iran relations] would mean examining deeds of a polit-
ical nature which lay outside the framework of the Court's powers.
But is it possible to ignore historical developments which have direct
repercussions on legal conflicts? 18 0
Following Judge Tarazi's lead, this section examines the relevance of
some of Iran's claims arising from the historical and political contexts of
the hostage crisis. It inquires whether the majority's reluctance to allow
the historical or political aspects of the case to affect its final determina-
tion impaired its ability to produce fair and effective results. Based on
this analysis, the discussion then focuses on whether a historically based,
less judicially inhibited framework of inquiry would be more suitable to
the resolution of adversary claims in politicized North-South disputes.
A. Iran's Historically Based Claims
Undoubtedly, some Iranian charges against U.S. policies were exag-
gerated and, moreover, so vaguely framed that in Iran's absence from the
proceedings, they remained unsubstantiated. Among these were Iranian
charges related to "the social, economic, cultural, and political conse-
quences of. . . [American] intervention in internal [Iranian] affairs" ' or
"flagrant and continuing violations of all international norms committed
by the United States in Iran."182
On the other hand, the central and most far-reaching piece in the
catalogue of Iranian allegations has been so amply documented by non-
Iranian, notably American sources, as to have been easily verifiable
through independently conducted Court inquiry. 83 The reference is to
the events surrounding the 1953 coup in Iran that overthrew the lawfully
elected and popular Mossadegh government and brought the Pahlavi dy-
nasty back to the throne. Even though absent from the proceedings, in its
written communications Iran charged the CIA with responsibility for the
1953 coup.184 The issue was thus properly before the Court, and given the
vast volume of information on the subject, the Court could have inquired
180. [1980] I.C.J. at 60 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
181. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
182. Id.
183. See R. COTrAM, NATIONALSM IN IRAN 332 (2d rev. ed. 1979), described as the most
reliable interpreter of Iranian political developments by Falk in Editorial Comment, 74 AM.
J. INT'L L. 411, 411 (1980). For an account by a participant in the 1953 events, see K.
ROOSEVELT, COUNTERCOUP: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF IRAN (1979).
184. Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
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on its own initiative into the truth of the Iranian assertions. Authoriza-
tion for such inquiry could be found in article 53 of the Court's Statute
which grants the judges wide powers of investigation into the facts and
law of cases where a party fails to go through Court proceedings.'88
There is nothing in the language of the Court's merit decision that
indicates why the Court chose to disregard Iran's 1953-based allegations.
It is arguable, however, that, as Judge Tarazi intimated in the above-
quoted passage,186 the majority's disregard, and thus implied dismissal of
these allegations, stemmed partly from a methodological choice-that is,
from its choice of a narrow time frame for selecting legally relevant issues,
which led it to exclude the issues related to the historical antecedents of
the case. Yet, Iran's allegations regarding the U.S. role in the overthrow
of the Mossadegh government raised questions related not only to the
application of diplomatic law, but also to the central issue before the
Court: if established, Iran's allegations would have shown that the United
States had derogated in 1953 from the same body of legal rules as it now
invoked to condemn the lawlessness of Iran's course of action during the
hostage crisis.
Iran's assertions charged that in 1953 the United States had used its
embassy as a staging ground for a CIA coup that overthrew the constitu-
tional government of the country. Such conduct, if proven, would dero-
gate from the Diplomatic and Consular Relations Conventionss8 which
simply codified the pre-existing customary law and which impose a duty
on diplomats and consular agents not to interfere in the internal affairs of
the receiving state or use the protected grounds in any manner incompat-
ible with their mission.188
The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to the diplomatic system.
It means that the receiving state respects the inviolability of diplomatic
missions and assumes responsibility for their protection, while the send-
ing state obligates itself to ensure that its diplomats do not interfere in
the internal affairs of the receiving country. To be sure, interference is a
flexible and relative notion and minor measures of it may be deemed
harmless and tolerable, just as minor violations of diplomatic immunity
sometimes go unnoticed or are overlooked. But Iran's assertions against
the United States raised a serious charge, pointing to acts that dislodged
a legally constituted government and subjected the country to a long pe-
185. Article 53 of the I.C.J. Statute mandates that in case of nonappearance of a party,
the Court must satisfy itself that "the claim is well founded in fact and law." In his dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Tarazi noted as follows: "In spite, and perhaps because, of the absence of
the Government of Iran from the proceedings, it behoved the Court to elucidate this partic-
ular point [the respondent's claim concerning post-1953 U.S. involvement in Iran's internal
affairs] before pronouncing on the responsibility of the Iranian State." [1980] I.C.J. at 60
(Tarazi, J., dissenting).
186. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
187. Note 3 supra.
188. Diplomatic Relations Convention, art. 41(1) and (3), note 3 supra; Consular Rela-
tions Convention, art. 55(1) and (2), note 3 supra. See [19801 I.C.J. at 38, para. 84.
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riod of dictatorial, often brutal rule. That Iran in 1979-80 had failed to
live up to its obligations under the Diplomatic and Consular Relations
Conventions was readily acknowledged by both the majority and dissent-
ing judges. But the majority's condemnation of Iran's culpability without
inquiry into the U.S. role in the events of 1953 could only raise serious
questions about the ability of the international adjudicatory process to
deliver equal justice.
The Court majority's choice of a narrow time frame in selecting justi-
ciable questions also accounts for a major flaw in a central point in its
opinion, namely, its interpretation of diplomatic law as constituting a
"self-contained regime." 19 The regime was so described, it will be recal-
led, in the sense of carrying within itself "efficacious" means of defense
available to the receiving state against illicit activities by diplomats and
consular agents. The means of defense consist of expulsion of the offend-
ing agents or the severance of diplomatic ties with the rule-breaking
state. From this the Court majority concluded that the proper remedy
"for dealing with [U.S.] activities of the kind of which [Iran] now com-
plains" were available within the diplomatic system.' 90 It added that
"Iran did not have recourse to the normal and efficacious means at its
disposal, but resorted to coercive action against the United States Em-
bassy and its staff."1 91
The Court's description of diplomatic law as "self-contained" has
practical validity if the U.S. activities of which Iran complained were
committed after the collapse of the Shah's regime-February 1979-that
is, in the period when Iran had a genuine option to exercise the means of
defense supplied by the rules of diplomatic law. But the language of
Iran's communications to the Court made it clear that its assertions
against the United States related to actions undertaken prior to the fall
of the Shah, most notably actions during the events of 1953.'" Since ex-
pulsion of diplomatic personnel as undesirable or severance of diplomatic
relations or both are more appropriate responses to immediate situations,
the diplomatic system provided less than adequate means by which Iran
could frame its response. Once the 1953 coup was complete, the only au-
thority internationally competent to bring the diplomatic means of de-
fense into operation was the Shah's government itself; is it realistic to
expect that a government put in place through a foreign-sponsored coup
would call to account the coup-sponsoring power for the very acts that
put the client government in power in the first place? If not, which seems
to be the obvious answer, the opportunity for Iran to call the United
States to account for alleged misdeeds committed in 1953 did not effec-
tively arise until after the fall of the Shah. Under these circumstances,
the denial of an effective hearing on Iranian claims on the
189. [1980] I.C.J. at 40, para. 86.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Letter of Dec. 9, 1979, note 23 supra.
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grounds-implicit in the majority opinion-that the Court could not con-
sider the historical or political context, amounted, in effect, to a denial of
justice.
The question of what the effect on the Court's findings would have
been had it opted for a broader time frame to accommodate Iran's 1953-
based claims is now in order. Had the Court established the truth of
Iran's assertions, there are at least two possible results to consider. One
was suggested by Judge Tarazi who, having unsuccessfully invited the
bench to investigate Iran's allegations, conducted his own inquiry and
concluded than Iran's "responsibility [in the hostage affair] ought to be
qualified as relative and not absolute."19 An alternative solution would
have been for the Court to condemn Iran's delinquency in unqualified
fashion as was done in the majority opinion, but couple this denunciation
with parallel pronouncements regarding the U.S. offense against Iran in
derogation of established diplomatic norms. In the latter case, the Court
might have declared two separate breaches of international undertakings,
each entailing a separate obligation to make reparations.
B. Political Conditions
In addition to the historically based claims, there are several condi-
tions surrounding the hostage case that a less inhibited method of inquiry
would cite as circumstances which would affect the nature and amount of
reparations owed by Iran to the United States. Two such conditions are
of particular importance and may be reviewed in brief. One was the ad-
mission of the Shah into the United States against warnings by the Ira-
nian government-then headed by Bazargan, a moderate in the post-rev-
olutionary spectrum-that such action may provoke hostile mob action
against the U.S. embassy. 19'
In their dissenting opinions both Judges Morozov and Tarazi invoked
the depth of Iranian feelings about the man as well as the history of U.S.
dealings with him to conclude that the admission of the Shah constituted
a provocative act that must enter into the assessment of the respective
responsibilities of the two parties. To be sure, nothing in the established
norms of international law would preclude a sovereign state from opening
its borders to a former head of state or from refusing to extradite him in
the absence of an extradition treaty, which, in any event, as normally
drafted would not cover "political crimes."1' 9 So, as the Court majority
assumed, the Carter Administration was technically within its rights as
regards its dealings with the former Shah. Yet, there is a question
whether a panel more sensitive to the equities of the case would not have
regarded these aspects of U.S. relations with the former Shah as some-
193. [1980] I.C.J. at 60 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
194. See Kifmer, How a Sit-In Turned into a Siege, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981 (Maga-
zine), at 54; Smith, Why Carter Admitted the Shah, id., at 36.
195. See Bassiouni, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice,
in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES 398 (C. Bassiouni ed. 1975).
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thing more than, to quote judge Morozov's characterization of what the
majority judgment suggests, "merely ordinary acts which just happened
to give rise to a 'feeling of offense.'"""
The second condition which might have been considered in assessing
the responsibilities of Iran and the United States toward one another has
to do with the chaotic political situation in post-revolutionary Iran, a sit-
uation in fact approaching a state of anarchy. Generally speaking, inter-
national law looks at the state as a monolithic entity, disregarding for
purposes of assessing rights and liabilities the peculiarities of its internal
structure and decisional processes. Each state has a government to speak
for its people in international fora, to accept obligations and press claims
on their behalf. This model of inter-state relations is useful in normal
times when there is a need for the Court to keep variables relevant to the
determination of claims and responsibilities within manageable propor-
tions. But a case can be made that under revolutionary conditions or in
situations approaching anarchy, which seems an apt description of Iran in
the post-revolutionary period, the internal circumstances of a defaulting
state must be brought to bear on the final allocation of liabilities. Judge
Tarazi touched on this essential point: in his view it was "unjust to lay all
the facts complained of at the door of the Iranian government without
subjecting the circumstances in which the acts took place to the least pre-
liminary examination."'' Instead, the Court majority uncritically ac-
cepted the information supplied by the United States and proceeded
under the assumption that Iran enjoyed a coherent structure of power in
the ordinary sense, when it was quite clear from the press and media re-
ports-as indeed conceded by the Carter Administration itself in pro-
nouncements not intended for the Court'"s-that this picture of a respon-
sible government in control of Iranian administration and policy was wide
off the mark.
The above paragraphs may be summarized as follows. The analysis in
this section indicates that a wider framework of appraisal than the one
used in the majority opinion is more likely to arrive at fair and equitable
results for politicized disputes arising in the context of relations between
developing and developed, i.e. Western states. Furthermore, the interna-
tional adjudicatory process being essentially consensual-in the sense of
196. (1980] I.C.J. at 57 (Morozov, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 63 (Tarazi, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and
Trade and the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of Peter Constable). Then Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Mr. Constable said,
We are dealing with a government in Iran that has few of the attributes we
expect of national authorities. Iran is a country torn apart by continuing revo-
lutionary turmoil. Our people are hostage not only to the militants but to in-
ternal power struggles and rivalries. And we are dealing with a nation that
faces not only the threat of internal disintegration but external threats to its
independence and territorial integrity from nations on its borders.
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depending for enforcement on consensus and cooperation of the par-
ties-a framework of inquiry and appraisal that is capable of producing
fair results also stands a better chance of meeting the requirements of
effectiveness, that is, of producing results with which parties may volun-
tarily comply. Of course, it is arguable that no matter what method of
inquiry the Court had selected and regardless of its ultimate findings, the
decision would not have been "effective" in this case since the chaotic
political conditions and near total lack of leadership in Iran made it all
but impossible for any Court-based solution to be accepted. This is a
plausible argument; but the Court's choice of method and the impact of
this choice on its findings must be evaluated in terms of their longer-
range effects on state attitudes, particularly attitudes in the Third World
in view of the North-South overtones of the hostage case. Viewed from
this perspective, the Court's refusal to adjudicate the equities of the hos-
tage case is likely to have an adverse effect on its future business by rein-
forcing Third World perceptions of the international adjudicatory process
as unable to accommodate claims arising from the politics of North-South
relations.1 99
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The Court's handling of the Iran hostage crisis is relevant beyond the
substantive law contained in its two opinions, and deserves more compre-
hensive analysis. Accordingly, this article has examined not only the law
of the case, but also the implications of the scope of inquiry adopted by
the Court.
On the one hand-as evidenced by the cohesion achieved by the
bench on most issues-the hostage case presented the Court with simple,
clear-cut questions of law. Neither the jurisdiction of the Court nor the
substance of applicable law left room for argument. The clarity of appli-
cable procedural and substantive rules enabled the Court to produce ba-
ses for decision around which the entire bench could rally; and this, in
turn, added authority and effectiveness to the Court's pursuit of its tradi-
tional judicial function of illuminating, settling, and developing points of
international judicial doctrine. This point is worth making in view of the
recent trend in the Court toward plural-opinion judgments which, even in
cases of unanimous opinions like the one rendered in Aegean Sea Conti-
nental Shelf, has often made it difficult to discern the Court's ratio
decidendi, thus diminishing the precedent-setting value of its findings. In
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff, by contrast, the Court
produced two disciplined opinions which together appear to confirm, clar-
ify, and settle several important issues of its case law. Five areas of con-
tribution may be singled out for emphasis.
First, the Court has confirmed the "irreparable prejudice" test as a
199. The non-Western, Third World countries have been notoriously skeptical of the
content and processes of customary international law. See note 115 supra.
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condition for the indication of interim measures of protection. Clearer
guidelines, however, as to what constitutes "irreparable prejudice" are
still needed. In Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, the Court held that an
injury which is "capable of reparation by appropriate means" did not
qualify as "irreparable. '20 0 Without explicitly saying so, the ruling in
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff seems to have applied a
similar criterion of "irreparability." The language of the interim opinion
implied that the injury capable of becoming "irreparable" in United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff case was the exposure of the de-
tained personnel to "privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life
and health" 2 0 1-in other words, the kind of injury which cannot be com-
pensated either monetarily or in kind.
Second, the interim opinion can also be read as indicating the contin-
ued adherence of a majority of the bench to the "prima facie possibility
of jurisdiction" test, namely, the view that for contemplating an award of
interim protection no more is required than a showing that there is prima
facie some possibility of jurisdiction on the merits. It will be recalled that
the interim opinion took pains to reaffirm this test 02 even though it was
"manifest" that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the merits. 0 3
Third, the Court has now established a judicial principle for evaluat-
ing the admissibility of interim claims which overlap with those advanced
for decision on the merits. In future cases, the Court should examine the
purpose behind such claims to determine whether-they are submitted in
good faith to protect the rights asserted in the principal application.
Fourth, the decision on the merits reformulates the 1976 Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf holding on the separation of powers in the law of the
United Nations in a manner that will allow closer integration of the Court
in the political activities of the world organization. At the very least, this
reformulation should lift any constitutional obstacle that may have been
inferred from Aegean Sea Continental Shelf to preclude collaborative ju-
dicial and political actions for the resolution of international conflicts.
Finally, the Court has reaffirmed-in language which indicates a
range which may exceed that of its previous jurisprudence-the jus-
ticiability of legal issues arising from political disputes.
Beyond the legal contributions of United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff,2 4 the case presents a unique opportunity to examine the
relationship between law and politics in the society of states or, more pre-
cisely, the question, ever present in politicized legal disputes, of which the
hostage crisis was a prime example, of whether and to what extent in-
quiry into legal claims can be extended to cover the underlying historical
200. [1976] I.C.J. at 11, para. 32.
201. [19791 I.C.J. at 20, para. 42.
202. Id. at 13, para. 15.
203. Id. at 14, para. 18.
204. [1979] I.C.J. 7 (order granting provisional measures); [19801 I.C.J. 3.
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setting of a dispute. On this issue, the Court came down squarely on the
side of traditional judicial notions that discourage inquiry into situations
not directly or immediately related to the claims submitted in litigation;
hence, its terse dismissal of Iran's political allegations as unsubstantiated
and in any case irrelevant to the determination of the merits. The analy-
sis contained in the above sections has suggested that a historically based
and equity-oriented framework of inquiry is more likely to produce re-
sults that are fair and effective. It is suggested here too that such a frame-
work would have a positive impact on the Court's future business by al-
laying doubts among the Third World countries about the adequacy of
Court-based adjudication for the vindication of claims arising in North-
South political contexts.
Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the United Nations' han-
dling of the hostage crisis is that, haphazard as it may have appeared at
times, 0 5 in its broad outlines it set forth a model of inquiry that can be
adapted to meet the operational requirements of a framework of judicial
appraisal and settlement of the kind recommended in this article. This
section concludes with some general observations about the creative pos-
sibilities implicit in the U.N. model of inquiry and offers comments on
how this model can be developed and refined to implement a more suita-
ble approach than afforded by the present processes of international ad-
judication for the resolution of claims arising from politicized disputes.
The model of inquiry implicit in parallel Court-U.N. commission ac-
tions suggests that the task of implementing a multidimensional frame-
work of appraisal does not necessitate a restructuring of the Court and its
processes. Indeed, it seems desirable to retain the Court's present struc-
ture and processes as best suited for the pursuit of its judicial functions
in nonpoliticized cases. On the other hand, for disputes requiring a wider
scope of appraisal, Court-based action can be supplemented by investiga-
tion into the extra-legal dimensions of the conflict by a panel like the
U.N. Commission of Inquiry. The attempt failed in the present case in
part because neither the task of the Commission nor its relations, if any,
with the Court were clearly defined, and in large measure because of the
inability of the revolutionary leadership in Iran to exploit the advantages
which the U.N. approach offered. But failure in one case need not prevent
inquiry into the creative possibilities that the parallel approach holds for
the future.
To explore in detail how this approach can be improved for future
action is beyond the scope of this article. Two critically important steps,
however, are suggested below. First, the investigating panel must be insti-
tutionalized on a continuing basis and its functions must be clearly de-
fined. Second, a link, missing in the present case, must be established
205. For the conditions surrounding the formation and workings of the U.N. Commis-
sion, see Smith, Putting the Hostages' Lives First, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1981 (Magazine), at
77 & 88-91.
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between the International Court and the proposed panel. The latter
would report its findings to the Court, which could then use them in
reaching a decision on the claims of the contending parties. The panel
itself could operate under one of the U.N. political organs or, alterna-
tively, as an agency of the Court under the terms of article 50 of its Stat-
ute which empowers the bench to "entrust any individual, body, bureau,
commission or any other organization that it may select with the task of
carrying out an inquiry. '" Entrusting the essentially political task of in-
vestigating the equities of a given situation to a panel linked to but sepa-
rate from the Court has the advantage of protecting the Court's integrity
as a judicial body. At the same time, closer integration of the Court into
the dispute-settling processes of the United Nations would enhance the
Court's institutional capital, making it more relevant to the resolution of
order-threatening international conflicts. In the long run, it may be the
most effective means for reversing the trend towards underuse of the
Court's adjudicatory processes-a trend which has virtually brought the
Court's contentious business to a vanishing point.
No doubt the Court's increased involvement in the politics of inter-
national disputes, even if carried out indirectly as proposed here, would
conflict with traditional notions that define the function of the judiciary
as one of declaring and applying the law. But the post war experience
with international adjudication has shown that application of this defini-
tion in the existing world context places the Court at risk of atrophy. The
solution suggested here, on the other hand, offers a promising compro-
mise between the requirements of protecting the judicial integrity of the
Court while at the same time transforming it into a more relevant and
frequently-used body in the settlement of international disputes.
206. I.C.J. STAT., art. 50.
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